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THE RULES AGAINST SCANDAL AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR
THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RELIGION CLAUSES
MARCI A. HAMILTON*
Theorizing about religious liberty and the Constitution, at least in
the law schools, tends too often to operate in a sphere divorced from
fact, or at least, informed by a small set of decided cases.  Cases are
couched in the following terms: A sincere religious believer is pitted
against an impersonal, domineering, and/or insensitive government.
That is not to say the believer always wins, but rather to point out that
most of the disputes that occupy constitutional scholars fit into this
pattern of an inherent imbalance of power and seem to involve no
one beyond the deserving believer and the intolerant state.  From
within this constricted world view, it becomes nearly irrational—and
often tyrannical—to take the government’s position, and irresistibly
tempting to assume that the religious believer is part of a “minority
religion” that cannot operate the levers of power effectively.  This
model dominates most interactions between government and religion
to drive discourse and theory away from a sound foundation.
The model also alters the meaning of the term “minority.”  Since
no majority of Americans belongs to any one religion, the already
loaded term “minority religion” can be stretched to cover virtually
every religious believer in the United States.1  The high ground be-
Copyright  2009 by Marci A. Hamilton.
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1. The unfortunate phrase “Christian country” is misleading at best.  The United
States is 26.3% Evangelical (which includes the Pentecostal, Holiness, Adventist, and Pietist
denominations as well as the evangelical traditions of the Baptist, Methodist, Nondenomi-
national, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Anglican/Episcopal, Restorationist, Congregationalist,
Reformed, and Anabaptist denominations); 23.9% Catholic; 18.1% Mainstream Protestant
(which includes the mainline Baptist, Methodist, Nondenominational, Lutheran, Presbyte-
rian, Anglican/Episcopal, Restorationist, Congregationalist, Reformed, Anabaptist, and
Friends denominations); 6.9% Historically Black Churches (which includes the Historically
Black tradition of the Baptist, Methodist, Nondenominational, Pentecostal, and Holiness
denominations); 1.7% Mormon (of which the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
constitutes 1.6% and the Community of Christ and unspecified Mormon denominations
make up the remainder); 1.7% Jewish (which includes 0.7% Reform, 0.5% Conservative,
0.3% Orthodox, and < 0.6% Other Jewish groups); 0.6% Muslim; 3.9% other (including
115
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comes the permanent seat of the believer, while the government’s in-
terest is lower, and any interests served by the government devalued.
This default reasoning leads to decisions like Wisconsin v. Yoder,2 in
which the Supreme Court did not consider the interest of children in
being educated through high school as the Court granted the right of
their parents to pull them out of school early to work on family
farms.3
I have written extensively on the fact that this is not an enlight-
ened framework from within which to judge theories of religious lib-
erty or to decide cases.  In fact, it is dangerous for the vulnerable, who,
due to the large percentage of Americans who profess religious be-
lief,4 frequently find themselves dealing with religious leaders, believ-
ers, and organizations.5  Moreover, it is not empirically sound to jump
to the conclusion that any particular religious entity is an oppressed
Buddhist, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Other Christian, Orthodox, Wiccan, Native American,
Pagan, and other world religions); and 16.1% unaffiliated (which includes atheism, agnos-
ticism, and no religion). PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LAND-
SCAPE SURVEY—RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 12 (2008), http://
religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.  Despite the num-
ber of Christians, they do not share a particular world view, set of policy preferences, or
social priorities. Id. at 13.   Moreover, the percentage of Christians as compared to non-
Christians is declining with Protestant denominations losing significant adherents and the
religiously unaffiliated emerging as the fastest growing population group. Id. at 5 (“The
Landscape Survey confirms that the United States is on the verge of becoming a minority
Protestant country; the number of Americans who report that they are members of Protes-
tant denominations now stands at barely 51%.”).  Moreover, the percentage of Christians
as compared to non-Christian religions is declining, with the expectation that Christians
will constitute less than 50% of the United States by 2042. See Ontario Consultants on
Religious Tolerance, Religious Identification in the U.S.: How American Adults View
Themselves (July 19, 2007), http://www.religioustolerance.org/chr_prac2.htm.
2. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
3. See id. at 234–36; see also Marci Hamilton, In Colorado Christian University v.
Weaver, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Adopts the Incorrect Theory that Religious
Individuals Are Entitled to Exemptions from Generally Applicable Laws, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Aug. 7,
2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20080807.html (discussing a recent deci-
sion further eroding the separation of church and state, in which a federal court over-
turned a state statute excluding students attending a “pervasively sectarian” college from a
scholarship program).
4. A recent comprehensive survey by the Pew Forum found that 92% of Americans
believe in God or a universal spirit, and that 83.1% of Americans are adherents of some
religious faith. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 1, at 5, 162. R
5. See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
12–13 (2007) (noting the phenomenon of child sexual abuse by members of the United
States clergy); Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Wide-
spread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2007)
(same); Marci A. Hamilton, The Maturing of a Movement: Statute of Limitations Reform for Sex
Abuse Victims, FINDLAW’S WRIT, June 11, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/
20090611.html (discussing “window legislation” passed by several states, which temporarily
permits victims of child sexual abuse to file otherwise expired claims).
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institution in the political context, even if it is small.  In reality, the
Court’s opinion in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith,6 was correct to point out that in the United States there is a
general preference for religious liberty, which is proven in the legisla-
tures across the country:
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection ac-
corded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact
laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed
word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous
of that value in its legislation as well.  It is therefore not sur-
prising that a number of States have made an exception to
their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.7
“Minority” and even hated religions have done quite well in the
legislative process, from widespread peyote exemptions for Native
American Church members following the Smith decision8 to child
medical neglect exemptions for Christian Scientists and other faith-
healing religions9 to clergy exemptions for reporting child abuse10 to
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. Id. at 890.
8. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2006) (amending the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978 to permit the use of peyote “in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B) (2001) (providing relig-
ious exemption in criminal peyote statute); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-22-317(3) (West
2003) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.204(8) (West 2007) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
4116(c)(9) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.02 Subd. 2(4) (West
Supp. 2009) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.541 (LexisNexis 2005) (same); N.M. STAT.
§ 30-31-6(D) (2005 & Supp. 2008) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.840(4) (2007) (same);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20B-14(17) (2004) (same); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.111(a) (Vernon 2003) (same); WIS. STAT. § 961.115 (West 2007) (same); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 35-7-1044 (2009) (same); 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2009) (exempting the use of peyote
in the Native American Church from federal regulations).  Many states also tie their ex-
emptions to federal law which, in the case of peyote, presently gives an exemption to Na-
tive American Churches. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.195 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
29-111(d) (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-203 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-3(c)
(West 1991 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-88(d) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-
02(4) (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-2.01(c) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-403(d)
(2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 69.50.201(d) (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. 60A-2-201(d) (LexisNexis 2005).
9. For example, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have religious exemp-
tions in their civil statutes on child abuse and neglect. See Religious Exemptions from
Health Care for Children, http://www.childrenshealthcare.org/legal.htm#Exemptions
(last visited Aug. 23, 2009).  Eighteen states—including Arkansas, New Jersey, and Wiscon-
sin—permit religious defenses to felony crimes against children. Id.  Moreover, twelve
states have religious defenses for misdemeanors. Id.
10. States that grant to “pastoral communications” an exemption from child abuse re-
porting laws include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
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the use of communion wine during Prohibition when Roman
Catholics were treated to widespread discrimination.11  Yet these facts
rarely enter the academic discourse.  Scouring the work of “leading”
religion scholars yields little or no attention to the fact of widespread
exemptions or the political facility of even small religious groups in
the political process.  Indeed, leading academics have declared the
opposite.  For example, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Douglas Laycock,
and Michael W. McConnell argued, in their 1991 Open Letter to the
Religious Community, that Smith represented a “sweeping disaster for
religious liberty,” without mentioning the impressive statutory exemp-
tions gained by religious groups.12
Add to this mix a powerful social taboo against criticizing relig-
ious entities, clergy, or beliefs in public, and you end up with discus-
sions and doctrine that are intellectually anemic and based on false
empirical assumptions.  This often thin gruel of discourse about relig-
ious liberty is not solely attributable to religious scholars or societal
taboos, however.  There is another factor in the social mix that further
suppresses the truth and makes it more difficult to accurately gauge
the empirical relation between religious liberty and the public good:
Religious institutions often hold and foster beliefs that forbid believ-
ers from telling outsiders about internal bad behavior.  In other
words, religious institutions act to suppress negative information in
ways that then further falsify reality to outsiders.  If outsiders do not
know about the bad actions of religious groups, they can easily under-
estimate the need to apply the law to them.
There has been an enormous amount of information regarding
the internal operation of religious organizations coming to the pub-
lic’s attention in the last five to ten years as a result of the child sex
abuse issues within the Roman Catholic Church (“RCC”);13 the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“LDS”);14 the Fundamen-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and  Wyoming.  Clergy
as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, http://www.childwelfare.gov/sys-
temwide/laws_policies/statutes/clergymandated.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2009).
11. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935).
12. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Douglas Laycock & Michael W. McConnell, An Open
Letter to the Religious Community, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1991, available at http://
www.firstthings.com/article/2007/10/004-an-open-letter-to-the-religious-community-37.
13. See Bishop Accountability, http://www.bishopaccountability.org (last visited Aug.
23, 2009) (collecting news and documents relating to child abuse in the Roman Catholic
Church).
14. See MARTHA  BECK, LEAVING THE SAINTS: HOW I LOST THE MORMONS AND FOUND MY
FAITH 228–30 (2005) (describing child abuse in the Mormon community); John Metcalfe,
One Man’s Brutal Encounter with Sexual Abuse in the Mormon Church, SEATTLE WKLY., May 29,
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talist Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS”);15 the Jehovah’s Witnesses (“JW”);16
and more recently the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jewish commu-
nities.17  While there had been coverage of childhood sexual abuse by
clergy in the RCC since the 1980s,18 the institutional role in furthering
the abuse through hierarchical cover-up did not come to public light
until 2002 when reporters at the Boston Globe broke the story of the
cover-up of abuse and the persistent transfer of pedophile priests by
bishops.19
In each of these religious communities (among others), there has
been an acknowledged rule (or theological principle) that forbade
the airing of dirty laundry to outsiders.  In the RCC, for example,
there has been a rule against “scandal,” which included stiff penalties,
such as excommunication, if believers told those outside the faith
about problems within it.20  In the Orthodox community, it is referred
to as “chilul hashem,” which literally means “desecration of God’s
2007, http://www.seattleweekly.com/2007-05-30/news/one-man-s-brutal-encounter-with-
sexual-abuse-in-the-mormon-church (same); Sexual Abuse Lawsuit Filed by Edmund J. Scanlan
Against Mormon Priest & Church of Latter-Day Saints, REUTERS, Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.
reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS230161+24-Feb-2009+PRN20090224 (same).
15. See, e.g., FLORA JESSOP & PAUL T. BROWN, CHURCH OF LIES 1–3 (2009) (describing
suffering at the hands of the FLDS).
16. See, e.g., Paul Vallely, The Big Question: Who Are the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Why Do
They Refuse Blood Transfusions?, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 6, 2007 (“A Panorama investigation re-
ported [Jehovah’s Witnesses] have an internal list of 23,720 reported abusers which they
keep private.”); Lisa Myers & Richard Greenberg, New Evidence in Jehovah’s Witness Allega-
tions, MSNBC, Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21917798 (alleging that the
Jehovah’s Witnesses have settled nine child sexual abuse lawsuits to protect prominent
church members); Silent Lambs, http://www.silentlambs.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2009)
(providing information about child abuse experienced in the organization of Jehovah’s
Witnesses).
17. See, e.g., RACHEL LEV, SHINE THE LIGHT: SEXUAL ABUSE AND HEALING IN THE JEWISH
COMMUNITY xxvii–xxviii (2003) (describing child abuse within the Jewish community);
Avrohom Mondrowitz, N.Y. to Battle Sexual Abuse Among Ultra-Orthodox Jews, HAARETZ, Apr.
1, 2009 (same); Hella Winston & Larry Cohler-Esses, No Sex Charge for Kolko; Boys’ Parents
Foiled by DA, JEWISH WK., Apr. 16, 2008 (same); Scott Michels, Orthodox Jewish Community
Struggles with Abuse Allegations, ABC NEWS, May 5, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
Story?id=7376057&page=1 (same).
18. See, e.g., Michael Hirsley, Accusations Distract Bishops from Agenda, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7,
1989 (detailing early allegations of a RCC cover-up of child abuse by priests).
19. See THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 3 (2002) (describing its coverage of the scandal as “the story of a large
number of Catholic priests who abused both the trust given them and the children in their
care”).
20. See THE SUPREME AND HOLY CONGREGATION OF THE HOLY OFFICE, INSTRUCTION ON
THE MANNER OF PROCEEDING IN CASES OF SOLICITATION (1962), http://image.guardian.
co.uk/sys-files/Observer/documents/2003/08/16/Criminales.pdf (describing a secret
procedure for handling sexual offenses and outlining a policy of the strictest secrecy under
penalty of excommunication).
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name,”21 and is deployed to prohibit giving the community a bad
name through revelations about inappropriate bad behavior within
the organization.22
Theories about institutions indicate that they often operate to
perpetuate themselves, and this is obviously one way that religious in-
stitutions can secure themselves from public criticism.  This is a rule,
though, that makes it difficult for citizens and scholars to assess how
necessary it is to apply generally applicable laws to religious organiza-
tions and believers.  If the troubling behavior is shielded from public
view, we are led to believe that the institution and its believers are not
in need of external checks on behavior and are even inherently virtu-
ous.  Since status and wealth of religious organizations are dependent
on their public face, there are strong forces that tempt religious lead-
ers to hide bad, and especially heinous, behavior from as many people
as possible.23
More troubling, such rules ensure that the vulnerable, such as
children and disabled adults, within or served by the organizations
may not receive the protection they need.  These rules guarantee not
only that the organization’s reputation is not defiled but also that a
cycle of abuse or mistreatment is fueled.24  Only sunlight is capable of
21. MICHAEL PRIOR, ZIONISM AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL: A MORAL INQUIRY 42 (1999).
22. RABBI YOSEF BLAU, CONFRONTING ABUSE IN THE ORTHODOX COMMUNITY 2–5 (2003),
http://www.jofa.org/pdf/uploaded/863-BWMF1871.pdf.
23. These motives do not distinguish religious bodies from others, e.g., businesses.
What is distinctive is that the religious entities are entering the political fray with such
motives and with virtually no required public disclosure of their finances or operations. See
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (allowing churches and religious organizations to qualify for fed-
eral income tax exemption); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES
AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: BENEFITS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE FEDERAL TAX
LAW 3 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.  Unlike nonreligious
nonprofits,
[a] church or religious organization is not required to provide a disclosure state-
ment for quid pro quo contributions when: (a) the goods or services meet the
standards for insubstantial value; or (b) the only benefit received by the donor is
an intangible religious benefit, [which include] admission to a religious ceremony
[and] de minimus tangible benefits, such as wine used in religious ceremony.
Id. at 25.  Additionally, unlike nonreligious nonprofits,
Congress has imposed special limitations, found in IRC section 7611, on how and
when the IRS may conduct civil tax inquiries and examinations of churches. The
IRS may only initiate a church tax inquiry if the Director, Exempt Organization,
Examinations reasonably believes, based on a written statement of the facts and
circumstances, that the organization: (a) may not qualify for the exemption; or
(b) may not be paying tax on an unrelated business or other taxable activity.
Id. at 26.
24. BishopAccountability.org maintains an archive of news articles detailing such
abuses. See, e.g., Susan Evans, Evidence Reveals Diocese Cover-up, TRIB.-DEMOCRAT Feb. 24,
2003, http://www.bishopaccountability.org/news2003_01_06/2003_02_24_Evans_Evi-
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protecting such individuals and it is sunlight that the rules against
scandal block.  The purpose of this Essay is to introduce the dynamic
of this vicious cycle.
Why is this relevant to constitutional discourse?  There are two
reasons.  First, there has been a recent uptick in interest regarding
theories of so-called “religious autonomy” for religious institutions.25
Purely as a matter of operation, legal autonomy would reach the same
results as the scandal rule, though the courts would be in the business
of keeping the institutions’ secrets.  It is additional insurance for relig-
ious entities seeking control of criminal and tortious actions from
within.  Second, the appearance of legislative free exercise statutes en-
acting the constitutional standard of strict scrutiny, such as the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)26 and the state RFRAs,27
provide more arguments for religious entities to avoid legal liability
and even discovery involving their internal bad actions.  If the former
were to come into effect or the latter were applied enthusiastically,
there is the very real potential that constitutional doctrine might work
hand in glove with hiding and perpetuating abuse of the vulnerable.
Moreover, constitutional scholarship would continue to operate out of
ignorance rather than fact.
denceReveals.htm (discussing how evidence for a 1994 trial against a priest for sexual
abuse was withheld because the documents were “believed to be protected under centu-
ries-old religious doctrine”).
25. See Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talk-
ing About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 837–39 (2009) (noting the Court’s recent “hands-
off” approach to matters that relate to religious doctrine); Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-
Called Church Autonomy Theory, supra note 5, at 232–38 (discussing religious autonomy in R
the context of child sexual abuse cases).
26. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006) (forbidding state and local governments from
imposing land use regulations as to impose a “substantial burden” on religious exercise).
27. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493.01 to .02
(2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–.05 (West
2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401 to -404 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1–35/99
(West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302–.307 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28-22-1 to -5 (LexisNexis 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 (West 2008); 71
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 1 §§ 2401–2407 (West 1990 & Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-
1 to -4 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 110.001–.012 (Vernon 2005).  The RFRA only applies to the federal government, be-
cause it is unconstitutional as applied to the states.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997).  The state religious liberty statutes have a wide range of exceptions for particu-
lar areas of the law, depending on the state.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR109.txt unknown Seq: 8 25-NOV-09 9:37
122 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:115
I. THE SCANDAL RULE
For ease of discussion, I will refer to the principle of internal se-
crecy that runs across religious entities as the “scandal rule.”  This is
the term employed by the RCC,28 but for purposes of this Essay its
colloquial meaning adequately captures the sense of the other reli-
gions’ rules imposing secrecy.  The rule operates primarily to block
the flow of information from moving from inside to outside of the
religious entity.  First, and most obviously, it impedes the movement
of information from within the organization to the following: (1) law
enforcement; (2) state agencies and lawmakers; (3) the media (in-
cluding news coverage and commentary and widely viewed and influ-
ential talk shows like Oprah and Larry King); (4) other nonprofit
organizations, social leaders, and philanthropists who might otherwise
take action for the victims; and (5) the public, which might well de-
mand prosecutorial action and legal reform if they knew the facts.
With the information stopping at the edge of the religious organiza-
tion, the people have very little chance of learning the existence of
the bad behavior.  This means that the ability of outsiders to stop the
inappropriate behavior—even when those outsiders are charged with
punishing, deterring, or monitoring that particular form of behav-
ior—is stymied before their social and public roles are fulfilled.
Second, the rule against scandal can block information flow be-
tween believers within the organization.  The way the rule typically
operates, the information is shared with as few people as possible even
within the organization.  Thus, in the RCC, until the Boston Globe sto-
ries, there was no open sharing of information between priests about
the abusive practices of their fellow priests, and even less sharing of
information with parishioners.  This means that even insiders, who are
the most invested in the organization’s reputation and future, lack the
information necessary to reform the organization.  In addition, if
there are isolated leaks of information, as there were with respect to
priests abusing children in the 1980s,29 the scandal rule keeps the flow
of information to a trickle, so that outsiders and insiders cannot assess
the depth and breadth of an internal problem.
The scandal rule is not just a regulation of information, however.
It is also an important means by which clergy maintain power over
their flocks and in the larger community.  When bad behavior (espe-
cially when it has a criminal element) can only be addressed in-house,
the leadership’s role of spiritual advisor expands to encompass civil
28. See supra text accompanying note 20. R
29. See supra text accompanying note 18. R
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judge, jury, and/or case worker.  That does not mean they take on all
of the functions of these social actors, but rather that they displace
them.  That not only enhances their standing in their own communi-
ties, but also puts them in a quasi-omniscient position.30
The scandal rule makes the vulnerable even more vulnerable
than one might think because even when the story starts to spread
more widely within the group, co-religionists often place their role as
believer above their public role.  For example, a prosecutor might re-
fuse to investigate or prosecute co-religionists even though his role
otherwise would demand such actions.31  A recent confirmation of
this reality involved Justice David T. Prosser Jr. on the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court.  When he was a prosecutor, parents learned of their
child’s abuse by a priest and intended to press charges.32  Prosser, ac-
companied by a deacon and another member of the parish, went to
the family’s home to urge the parents not to publicly embarrass the
RCC.33  They succeeded.34
Clergy may also impress outsiders into observing the rule.  It is
common knowledge that prosecutors across the country, whether co-
religionists or not, received reports regarding sexual abuse by RCC
priests, and when approached by the local bishop, agreed to let the
diocese handle its own “dirty laundry.”35  Prosecutors apparently as-
sumed that they were hearing about isolated events, not a church-
wide, mandated process for handling abuse secretly.  Their lack of in-
formation was attributable to the relative success of the scandal rule;
prosecutors simply did not have the quantum of information needed
for them to suspect the larger, insidious pattern.36  Alternatively, pros-
ecutors saw a pattern but believed in the social myth that religious
entities are equipped to handle the suffering of anyone hurt, includ-
30. See ADAM D. MOORE, INFORMATION ETHICS: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND POWER 406–07
(2005) (recounting massive child abuse discovered within Atlanta’s House of Prayers con-
gregation); Karen E. Pettigrew & Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Control of Community Informa-
tion: An Analysis of Roles, 66 LIBR. Q. 373, 375 (1996) (researching the control of
information within community networks).
31. Another possibility is that the police might tip off the diocese of priests under in-
vestigation. See, e.g., Letter from “Fred” to “John” (Feb. 25, 1986), available at http://www.
bishopaccountability.org/docs/boston/oleary/OLEARY_ARTHUR_P_1_048_050.pdf (let-
ter reporting that a state police captain admitted to “going against his own regulations” to
tip off the Boston Archdiocese about Reverend Arthur P. O’Leary’s upcoming arrest).
32. Marie Rohde, Justice Prosser’s Link to Priest Case Assailed: As DA in ’79, He Decided Not
to Prosecute, Records Indicate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 2008, at A1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra note 5, at 15. R
36. Id.
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ing those sexually abused.37  That myth is perpetuated by the rules
against scandal.
Similarly, numerous news sources abetted the scandal rule when
the bishops pressured them to keep the abuse and the bishops’ knowl-
edge of the abuse confidential.  The Philadelphia Inquirer falsely ac-
cused reporter Ralph Cipriano of lying when Cipriano authored a
story exposing the Philadelphia Archdiocese’s handling of clergy
abuse,38 and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel moved Marie Rohde off the
church beat when she started to dig too deeply.39  And while the Bos-
ton Globe broke the cover-up story first, allegations had swirled around
for years before the Globe published the first article on the cover-up of
clergy abuse.40
Religious organizations also invest heavily in keeping the infor-
mation protected by the scandal rule out of the public eye.  One of
their key initiatives is intended to ensure that older cases never make
it to court.  In 2009, the Catholic Conference invested in lobbyists to
defeat a bill in the New York legislature that would have eliminated
the statute of limitations for all child sex abuse victims for a year, even
if the statute of limitations had already expired.41  In Colorado, the
Archdiocese of Denver has dedicated a “very large sum” to a media-
tion firm to accomplish the same end.42  Why?  Because such legisla-
tion forces their mandatorily secret information public, as happened
in California when similar legislation was in place during 2003.43  The
FLDS has hired one of the most effective public relations firms in
Utah to go into hyperdrive whenever news leaks about its polygamous
practices.  When Texas authorities discovered widespread statutory
rape and child bigamy at the Yearning for Zion Ranch in Eldorado,
37. See, e.g., Mike Stanton & Tom Mooney, The Abuse Files: Lawsuits Unearth Secret Church
Papers, Shedding New Light on Allegations of Priest Sex Abuse Going Back Decades, PROVIDENCE J.,
Dec. 2, 2007, at A1 (explaining that the Massachusetts state police agreed to allow a dio-
cese to handle “internally” those crimes related to the church).
38. RALPH CIPRIANO, COURTROOM COWBOY: THE LIFE OF LEGAL TRAILBLAZER JIM BEASLEY
306–09 (2008) (discussing the libel suit that Cipriano then filed against the Philadelphia
Inquirer).
39. Bruce Murphy, The Catholic Cover-up, MILWAUKEE MAG., Feb. 13, 2007.
40. See THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 19, at viii. R
41. See Amy Kotlarz, Revised Markey Bill to Be Voted on by N.Y. Assembly Within Days, CATH-
OLIC COURIER, June 6, 2009, http://www.catholiccourier.com/tmp1.cfm?nid=78&articleid=
107524; Hugh Kramer, Catholic Church Helps Quash Child Sex-Abuse Legislation, EXAMINER,
Aug. 15, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-8947-LA-Atheism-Examiner~y2009m8d15-
Catholic-Church-helps-quash-child-sexabuse-legislation.
42. Jean Torkelson, Archbishop Offers Mediation Process: Chaput Hires Firm to Seek Settle-
ments in Alleged Abuse Cases, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 25, 2006.
43. See Jean Guccione & William Lobdell, Law Spurred Flood of Sex Abuse Suits, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A1.
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Texas, in 2008, the organization’s patriarchs reacted with a multistage
public relations campaign, including paying to set up a sophisticated
website and frequenting high-profile talk shows, to distract from the
facts they wished to keep secret.44  The same phenomenon exists in
the Jewish world.45
The facts reported to the public were troubling. For years, FLDS
prophet Warren Jeffs routinely took underage girls across state and
international lines to be married to much older men in plain violation
of the Mann Act.46  After intense pressure on the FBI, mostly coming
from groups like Tapestry Against Polygamy and Child Protection Pro-
ject (groups of formerly polygamous wives and/or children),47 Jeffs
was finally apprehended and convicted of two counts of being an ac-
complice to rape.48  In 2008, the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services responded to a report of abuse at the FLDS’s
Yearning for Zion Ranch compound in Eldorado, Texas, and took all
of the children into custody.  Based on the agency’s final report, over
twenty-five percent of pubescent girls at the compound had been the
victims of statutory rape, with over half of those rapes resulting in
pregnancies: Twelve girls were “spiritually” married at ages ranging
from twelve to fifteen, and seven of the girls had one or more chil-
dren.49  FLDS spokesman Willie Jessop responded to the state’s offi-
cial report by attempting to deflect attention away from the bad acts
44. Ben Winslow & Nancy Perkins, FLDS Take Their Battle Online, DESERET NEWS, Apr.
22, 2008, at A5.
45. See generally TEMPEST IN THE TEMPLE: JEWISH COMMUNITIES AND CHILD SEX SCANDALS
(Amy Neustein ed., 2009); see also Robert Kolker, Accused Pedophile Rabbi Still Go-Carting,
N.Y. MAG., Aug. 7, 2006 (describing a Brooklyn rabbi accused in two sexual-abuse lawsuits);
Hella Winston & Larry Cohler-Esses, Yeshiva Fired, Then Paid, Rabbi Charged with Abuse, JEW-
ISH WK., Apr. 2, 2008 (noting an allegation that a school’s chief administrator “‘knew of
allegations that [a rabbi] was sexually abusing boys at [a Jewish school] years before’ but
failed to act”).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006).  The statute provides the following:
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce,
or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such indi-
vidual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can
be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id.
47. See Tapestry Against Polygamy, http://www.polygamy.org (last visited Aug. 24,
2009) (offering resources and support for refugees affected by polygamy and advocating
for changes to make the transition easier for those leaving the lifestyle); Child Protection
Project, http://www.childpro.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2009) (providing awareness about
child abuse and polygamy within religious institutions).
48. Polygamist ‘Prophet’ to Serve at Least 10 Years in Prison, CNN, Nov. 20, 2007, http://
www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/11/20/jeffs.sentence.
49. Ben Winslow, FLDS Report Says 12 Girls Married Underage, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 24,
2008, at A1.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR109.txt unknown Seq: 12 25-NOV-09 9:37
126 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:115
with the claim that it was just a “sensational” bid to make the sect look
bad.50  The underlying message was that it was offensive for the state
to reveal the FLDS’s secrets. The numbers, in fact, are in all likelihood
an undercount because girls were instructed to lie about their ages
and the sect does not file birth certificates, making it impossible to
verify exact age.51
The ultra-Orthodox Jewish community has enforced the scandal
rule vigilantly and successfully until very recently.52  Now, there is an
ongoing debate among rabbis regarding the appropriateness of tell-
ing the authorities about child sex abuse, with some adhering to the
scandal rule while others propose sending the information through
inside channels and only then to the authorities.53  This was the ap-
proach that the RCC crafted at its Dallas meeting following the Boston
Globe’s revelations.54  Suffice it to say that the scandal rule has not
been removed from the culture of the RCC, with Cardinal George of
Chicago and Archbishop Timothy Dolan of Milwaukee (now New
York) recently covering up information about active abusers.55
Two contemporary developments in the field of religious liberty
threaten to intensify the negative externalities generated by the scan-
dal rule.  I will now turn to each of these to examine how they further
the scandal rule while undermining the ability of the vulnerable to
protect themselves.
II. THE THEORY OF RELIGIOUS AUTONOMY (FOR INSTITUTIONS)
Two current legal tactics have been attractive to religious entities
and extremely troubling to children’s advocates and those who work
to protect the vulnerable from religious entities.  First is the notion of
50. Robert T. Garrett, 12 Girls at Ranch Sexually Abused, CPS Says ‘Spiritual’ Marriages
Cited; Sect Spokesman Slams Agency’s Report, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 24, 2008, at A1.
51. Id. (noting that state Child Protective Services workers found a “pattern of decep-
tion” revealing that “[s]ect members shredded documents, and women and youngsters
withheld information about their identities and family ties”).
52. Hella Winston, Brooklyn DA Announces New Plan to Urge Reporting of Abuse, JEWISH
WK., Apr. 1, 2009 (“Acknowledging the community’s insularity and the cultural taboo
against reporting abuse to the secular authorities, [Brooklyn District Attorney] Hynes
stressed the importance of partnering with Orthodox institutions and leadership in this
effort.”).
53. Id.; see also BLAU, supra note 22, at 3–4 (recognizing that the Jewish community
must learn to “recognize abuse” and “[p]roper[ly] utiliz[e] . . . secular authorities”).
54. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ESSENTIAL NORMS FOR DIOCE-
SAN/EPARCHIAL POLICIES DEALING WITH ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY
PRIESTS OR DEACONS (2002), http://www.usccb.org/ocyp/2005EssentialNorms.pdf.
55. See Manya A. Brachear, Margaret Ramirez & Azam Ahmed, Cardinal Lifts the Veil on
Abuses, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 2008, at C1; Annysa Johnson, SNAP Group Says Archbishop Dolan
Lax on Abusive Priests, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 6, 2009.
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religious “autonomy,” which is a benign label that papers over the
peril of church autonomy for children and disabled adults.56  Second
is the movement to enact laws that protect religious exercise by impos-
ing strict scrutiny across the board, like RFRA and the state RFRAs.57
The notion of “autonomy” from the law is couched in libertarian
terms, but creates the opportunity for licentiousness, which the found-
ing generation rightly feared.  Although there are various iterations of
it, Professor Douglas Laycock describes the principle as it would apply
to individuals as follows: “[F]rom the view that religious liberty con-
sists of minimizing government influence and maximizing individual
choice, government best protects religious liberty in the usual case by
exempting religious practices from regulation.”58  More recently, Pro-
fessor Richard Garnett of the University of Notre Dame Law School
has worked to craft a theory of institutional autonomy:
There is, finally, the most ancient rationale of all, namely,
that secular authorities lack the power to answer some ques-
tions—religious questions—whose resolution is, under an ap-
propriately pluralistic political theory, left to other
institutions.  It is not that religious questions are hard, weird,
or irrelevant; it is that they are questions that the political
authority lacks power, or jurisdiction, to answer.  This ratio-
nale, it seems to me, is not only the strongest; it also pulls the
hands-off rule from the margins of First Amendment esoter-
ica to the very heart of religious freedom and church-state
separation, properly understood.  I have suggested elsewhere
that “the preservation of the churches’ moral and legal right
to govern themselves in accord with their own norms and in
response to their own calling is our day’s most pressing relig-
ious freedom challenge.”59
With the scandal rule in place, there is no need for an autonomy
rule—if the information regarding bad behavior never goes beyond
the elite clergy or well-controlled clusters of members, legal violations
remain hidden from public view.  Literally, the law cannot be en-
forced and, for the institution, need not be avoided.  What happens
when the rule against scandal starts to fail?  So far, it appears that
religious entities resort to outside forces to further the project of se-
56. See supra text accompanying note 25. R
57. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. R
58. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 200 (2004); see also Doug-
las Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1981).
59. Garnett, supra note 25, at 861–62 (citation omitted). R
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crecy.  If the rule against scandal becomes increasingly difficult to en-
force, a theory of legal autonomy becomes very attractive as it would
enlist the First Amendment to achieve the same ends.  If the secrets
cannot be kept internally and, therefore, the law will be brought to
bear, legal autonomy is needed to avoid accountability, legal punish-
ment, and penalties.
To be sure, those advocating religious or institutional autonomy
do not express any intent to keep secret the illegal behavior occurring
in religious institutions.  Nor do the briefs filed by religious organiza-
tions demanding “autonomy” come out and say that their project is to
perpetuate the rule against scandal.  Regardless of the couching of
autonomy theory, though, it is simple fact that an autonomy doctrine
would work synergistically with scandal rules.
The primary problem with “autonomy” in general is that it entails
unaccountability and therefore operates to perpetuate illegal or im-
moral behavior.  When religious entities operate with the scandal rule
in place, lawmakers are disabled from protecting the vulnerable due
to lack of knowledge.  One of the recent relevant issues has been
whether to deter child abuse within religious organizations by creat-
ing a legal obligation to report known abuse.  When reporting re-
quirements started to appear, either legislators did not know that they
would need to impose such a requirement on clergy and religious in-
stitutions (as a result of the success of the scandal rules) or religious
entities requested exemptions and legislators knew too little to chal-
lenge them (again because of the success of the scandal rules).60  It
should not be surprising that once the RCC cover-up “scandal” broke
in 2002, states with clergy exemptions started to change their statutes
to include reporting for clergy.61  The education of the legislators led
to more protective measures for children.  Such a move can only
60. Another possibility is that they were overly cautious about interfering with the
clergy-communicant privilege. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that a priest and archbishop had a reasonable expectation of privacy under
Fourth Amendment and that a district attorney’s plan to wiretap a murder confession by a
suspect to his priest was a violation of RFRA); see also Julie M. Arnold, Note, “Divine” Justice
and the Lack of Secular Intervention: Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in Mandatory
Reporting Statutes to Combat Child Sexual Abuse, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 849, 851 (2008) (arguing
that states should abrogate the privilege in relation to existing mandatory reporting
statutes).
61. See Fred Bayles, States Add Clergy to Sex-Abuse Laws, USA TODAY, July 5, 2002, at A1
(explaining that Massachusetts, Illinois, Missouri, and Colorado have added clergy to their
mandatory reporting statutes since the beginning of 2002); see also Michael Powell, Catholic
Clout Is Eroded by Scandal, WASH. POST, July 6, 2002, at A1 (noting that New York also passed
legislation in June 2002 that required clergy to report incidents or allegations of non-fam-
ily child abuse to authorities).
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work, though, if it is constitutional to make religious entities accounta-
ble for the harm they cause, which is to say if they are not “autono-
mous” from the law that governs others.
The Supreme Court has never adopted the “autonomy” theory in
the sense that some today advance it.62  At most, it has forbidden
courts from interpreting religious doctrine or making ecclesiastical
choices.63  It would be hard to believe that the relatively recent rise in
interest in an autonomy theory on the part of denominations with
serious abuse issues is disconnected from the fact that secrets about
abuse within institutions are now being released.
III. RFRA AND STATE RFRAS
Like “autonomy,” the RFRA strict scrutiny formula looks most ap-
propriate when not tethered to unpleasant facts.  When passed, mem-
bers of Congress had good intentions but too little information, in
part because of the success of the scandal rule across religious denom-
inations.  From 1990 to 1993, when RFRA was being formulated and
debated, there were inklings of a pattern of abuse within the RCC, but
there was no widespread or public knowledge of the complicity of
bishops and the Vatican.  The last question members of Congress
would have asked is whether RFRA would impact negatively on chil-
dren.  That is not just a result of the general taboo against talking
negatively about religion (a most potent taboo for politicians seeking
62. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1112 (2004).
63. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 (1979) (stating that if a state law provides
that the identity of a local church is to be determined by the “laws and regulations” of the
general hierarchical church, then the First Amendment requires that state courts defer to
a determination of that local church’s identity by the authoritative ecclesiastical body);
Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin., United Methodist Church v. Cal. Super. Ct., 439 U.S.
1369, 1372 (1978) (explaining that while there exist “constitutional limitations on the ex-
tent to which a civil court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cogni-
zance,” the Supreme Court “never has suggested that those constraints similarly apply
outside the context of such intraorganization disputes”) (citation omitted); Presbyterian
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449 (1969) (noting that the First Amendment “severely circumscribes the role that civil
courts may play in resolving church property disputes”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 727 (1871) (explaining that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ec-
clesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicato-
ries . . . the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and binding on them, in
their application to the case before them”); see also HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra
note 5, at 190 (explaining that Supreme Court cases have only said that “courts are not R
permitted to decide any solely ecclesiastical question between members from within the
organization”).
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voting blocs), but also the success of the scandal rule, which secured
the facts in “secret archives,” to which only bishops were admitted.
I do not want to over-exaggerate the success of the scandal rule.
When the issue is abuse, keeping a tight lid on information, at least as
of the latter part of the twentieth century, has been increasingly diffi-
cult as the legal status of children and abuse victims in general has
improved.  State agencies charged with children’s welfare were aware
of children being hurt in religious environments before 2002, to be
sure, and they strongly opposed RFRA once they understood that it
would impact their efforts to save children.64  One of the most serious
problems with RFRA was its enormous scope and the near impossibil-
ity of comprehending its impact while it was being enacted.  The rules
against scandal compounded the difficulties posed by RFRA by sup-
pressing information about the religious entities’ harmful behavior.
The verbiage surrounding its passage was all about “religious lib-
erty.”  Indeed, there was an agreement among the lobby of religious
groups, which forbade discussion of the particular legal exemptions
each sought under RFRA, because it would lead to too much infight-
ing.65  For example, the Christian Legal Society was most interested in
RFRA because it wanted to create opportunities for evangelical Chris-
tians and others to refuse to rent apartments to homosexuals or un-
married couples, a principle that the progressive mainstream
Protestants could not have supported.66  It was easier to lobby for “lib-
erty” if the mainstream closed its eyes and ears to the likely practical
impact of the law.  The fair housing issues eventually persuaded the
American Civil Liberties Union that its support for RFRA was prob-
lematic.67  Thus, everybody spoke solely about the virtue of religious
liberty and overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Di-
vision, Department of Human Resources v. Smith68 without any really seri-
ous discussion about the illegal practices of religious believers and
institutions that would be permitted with RFRA in place.  Abstraction
and political rhetoric, not facts, were the order of the day.
64. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Religious Exemptions from Child Abuse Statutes, 81
PEDIATRICS 169, 170–71 (1988).  The American Academy of Pediatrics is also on the record
opposing state exemptions for parents who have denied medical care to their children for
religious reasons. See News Release, American Academy of Pediatrics, Pediatricians File
Brief in Prayer vs. Medical Care Case (Dec. 29, 1998), available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20050213224926/http://aap.org/advocacy/washing/prayer.htm.
65. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL, supra note 5, at 180–81. R
66. Id.
67. Id. at 183–84.
68. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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In operation, however, RFRA did affect children’s issues, leading
children’s advocates to oppose re-enactment of RFRA after it was held
partially unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.69  They were one of
the main reasons (along with the cities and municipalities) that the
Religious Liberty Protection Act (“RLPA”) was never passed.70  This
illustrates that once the facts are brought to the attention of legisla-
tors, they are capable of denying demands by religious entities.  But in
the absence of facts, the balance often tips in favor of the religious
lobbyists who control information that might well reverse public pol-
icy decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The scandal rule creates an environment within religious organi-
zations that is propitious for those who would abuse children and dis-
abled adults, or who would cover up such abuse to protect power,
image, and wealth.  It also has external effects that make it much
more difficult for those in civil society to protect the vulnerable.
When discussing the merits of autonomy or high protection of relig-
ious liberty, the scandal rule needs to be one of the foci for debate.
Without acknowledging its powerful presence and operation, it is far
too easy to presume that the protection of religious practice is a neces-
sary good.
69. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
70. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Relig-
ious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 334 (2003).
